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THE SELLER'S ACTION FOR THE PRICE.
W HEN a contract of sale has been broken by the buyer, be-
fore title has passed according to the usual rules of pre-
sumption, there arises the very practical question whether
the seller can sue him for the purchase price, as such, or is limited
to a suit for damages only. In the latter case his damage may hap-
pen to equal the purchase price, but it is usually considerably less
than that amount.. If the seller can recover the purchase price, as
such, it must be because that price is legally due him as a conse-
quence of the contract. The ultimate inquiry is, therefore, whether
the buyer's promise to pay the purchase price, of itself creates an
enforcible obligation to pay it; or, if the promise itself does not do
so, whether the seller can create such obligation by further action on
his own part alone. The cases actually arising out of contracts of
sale are in conflict, and it is, therefore, of more than academic value
to examine the background and analogies of the matter.
If there be, as a result of the buyer's promise, an enforcible lia-
bility to pay ;he agreed price, it must be either an anomalous liabil-
ity, or a form of the old liability for a debt. There seems to be
nothing in the historical development of the latter liability, however,
to warrant assumption that a debt arises out of the mere promise,
even though on consideration, to pay. For the sake of clarity, it
may be noted that "legal liability" as here used means liability
enforced by the courts so directly as practicable, and not that moral
obligation to perform a contract according to its terms, sometimes
said to arise out of every contract regardless of the legal remedy.
In reference to the historical development of liability in debt, re-
search writers are agreed that no debt was created by a mere promise
to pay money. A quid pro quo, distinct from a mere reciprocal
promise, was essential. Thus, says Aires, "as to debt on simple
contract, it is a rule without exception in modem times that the
debt must be founded on a quid pro quo." "The quid pro quo which
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
the debtor must receive to create his duty might consist of anything
that the law could regard as a substantial benefit to him. * * *
But debt will not lie upon mutual promises.'" And again, in tracing
the right of the parties to a contract of sale to bring reciprocal ac-
tions for detinue and debt, he shows that the remedies came to
exist without transfer of possession of either the chattel or the
money, and without reciprocal exchange of anything tangible. He
adds, however, that "the right of the buyer to maintain Detinue,
and the corresponding right of the seller to suen Debt were not
conceived of by the medieval lawyers as arising from mutual prom-
ises, but as resulting from reciprocal grants--each party's grant
of a right forming the quid pro quo for the corresponding duty of
of the other."2
"Debt, then, we may say, lies to recover money or. chattels due
and made certain in amount -by contract, by custom, or by record.
In this definition the term 'contract' has a technical meaning which
is not so broad as that now commonly attached to it. The term here
means such a contract as was sufficient at common law to create
a debt. Accordingly it must be either a simple contract in which a
quid pro quo passes to the debtor at the time the debt is created, or
it must -be a contract in the form of a'specialty. Negatively, the
contract which creates a debt is not the simple promise upon which
alone the action of assumpsit will lie, as where mutual promises
are given ** *"a "Neither debt nor detinue ever became completely
proprietary or delictual or completely contractual.. The fact was
never lost sight of that the action of debt was based upon mutual
grants * * * ."4 It thus appears that, in the opinion of research
writers, the same breadth of consideration that will permit an action
of assumpsit on a promise, will not necessarily also create such an
obligation as to permit the remedy of an action of debt. The quid
pro quo necessary to the latter is narrower, and does not include a
mere reciprocal promise; it must, rather, be a reciprocal grant or giv-
ing of something more materially valuable than a promise.'
I Lectures on Legal History, p. go.
SS Harvard Law Rev. asg."
s Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, Vol. I1, p. i27.
' Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng. Law, Vol. III, p. 326.
9 Pollock & Maitland, Hist. of Eng. Law, Vol. II, p. azo ff. "We much doubt whether
at the end of the zith century the action extended beyond those cases in which the de-
fendant had received some material thins or some service from the plaintiff." "It enters
no one's head that a promise is tht ground of this action." It is founded on a "c.sss
debexdi. and that cause will not be a promise."
Holdsworth, however. suggests this:-The promise of a seller later to convey gives,
now that assumpsit has developed, a right of action in damages if he should fail. This
is just as much a veritable right as is the right of action for failure to deliver a specific
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Whether modern cases adhere to this historical limitation of the
legal existence of a debt, is a conclusion founded on meagre evi-
dence. Actual cases in which there has not been a real quid pro quo
are rare, except those arising out of contracts of sale, and these are,
as will be shown, in conflict.
In occasional cases one finds it said that "debt will lie on a simple
contract," but there is no evidence, contextually, to indicate that
the statement is intended to be precise, and inclusive of contracts
arising out of mutual promises. It invariably arises in reference to
some other point, such as that it is immaterial whether the contract
is oral or written, or under seal. The usual cases in which the law
imposes a duty to pay money-other than as the result of statue Qr
of a grknt-namely, those founded on the "common counts," do not,
in the theory of their origin or in their actual decisions, bear upon
the effect of mutual promises in creating a debt.
It is true that the promise evidenced by a bill of exchange or
promissory note does create a liability in debt. But this. after all,
is made consistent-with the proposition that such a liability arises
only out of a reciprocal grant, by the judicial fiction that these
promises originated as a return for an actual quid pro quo. Thus in
Hard'$ CaseT it was held that "Inidebitatus assumpsit will lie in no
case but where a debt lies, therefore it lies not upon a wager, nor
upon a mutual assumpsit, nor. against the acceptor of a bill of ex-
change; for his acceptance is but a collateral engagement. But it
lies against the drawer himself, for he was really a debtor by the
receipt of the money, and debt would lie against- him." In Rayborg
v. Paytons it was held that an action of debt could be brought by
the indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor, on the ground
that "a duty to pay" was clearly established. The court founded
this "duty," however, not on the promise, but on the assumption
that "an acceptance is evidence of money had and received by the
acceptor for the use of the holder." Likewise, in Willmarth v.
Crawford,' an indorsee of a note was allowed to sue the maker by
an indebitatus action because "the theory in relation to a promissory
note is, that the drawer has received 'a sum of money from the
chattel belonging to the plaintiff. If a grant of the latter right will serve as a quid pro quo
on which to assame a grant of the price, as a debt, by the buyer, why, now that the
former exists In law, will it not also serve as ouid pro quo on which to predicate the buy-
er's reciprocal grant'of the price. -
Morri v. School District, z2 Me. 293.
zi Salk, 23; 91 Rug. Rep. 2, 169.
•2 Wheaton 38S. This decision was followed, without discussion, in Kirhmsn v.
H-milton, 6 Peters ao.
0 so Wend. (N. Y.) 34z.
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payee and promises in consideration therefor, to repay it to him or
to a person whom he may designate at a future day."
In Bishop v. Young" the payee of a promissory note was allowed
to sue the maker in debt because the note had "an apparent consider-
ation." The case does not indicate what was meant by that phrase;
it might be as broad as the term consideration is usually held to be.
So also, in Dunlap v. Buckingham,"' it was said, "The law is welf
settled, that an action of debt may be maintained by the payee of a
bill of exchange or a promissory note against the drawer or maker,
when the instrument is expressed to be for value received, or.pur-
ports to be founded on some consideration. * * * And the action of
debt may also be supported by the payee against the drawer or
maker, although no consideration -be expressed on the face of the
bill or note. The law implies that the instrument is based upon a
good consideration. (Quoting from Hatch v. Trayes, ii A. & E.
702) 'We are of the opinion that those words (value "received)
express only what the law must imply in- each case, from the
nature of the instrument and the relation of the parties apparent
upon it; and that it therefore makes no difference, as to this ques-
tion, whether they be or be rnot inserted.' " What this "apparent
consideration" is, which the law will imply, is perhaps explained by
the use of the same phrase in Hodges v. Steward,"2 "And in this.
case it was often times said, that an indebitatus assumpsit does not
lie upon a bill of exchange, as it has been ruled in diverse cases,
but against a drawer for value received there it would lie; but
this is for the apparent consideration." This owing of a debt,
therefore, by a party to a note or bill of exchange, is obviously based
on the assumption that he has not only promised to pay, but has
received in return for his promise something of more value than
a mere counter promise.
In other cases the right of a promisee of money to sue in debt,
without other consideration than his own counter promise, has been
positively denied. And this denial may very plausibly be ascribed
to the fact that a mere promise on consideration, but without quid
pro quo, does not create a debt. In International Text Book Co. v.
Jones,13 for instance, the plaintiff had contracted to furnish defend-
ant with text4,ooks and lessons, in return for which defendant had
promised to pay $5o4o on stated dates. Before the plaintiff had ac-
tually done anything by way of performance of his agreement, and
1 2 1os. & Pul. 78, z28 Eng. Rep. :z6o.
11 z6 M11. zog.
"Skinner, 346; 90 Eng. Rep. 154
23 z66 Micb. 86.
.287
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before title to anything had passed from him, 
defendant repudiated
the contract. When the time set for 
payment arrived, plaintiff
brought suit, not for damages, but for the 
whole sum promised, "on
.the claims that the contract contained 
an unqualified promise to pay
certain installments at the stated times 
* * * and that, the time
having elapsed within which all of the 
payments were to become
due, the defendant is liable upon his promise; 
leaving plaintiff to-
perform its contract, which it is 
willing to do." The court refused
to allow recovery of more than damages, 
saying, "The conteat
price is recoverable only on the theory of performance, 
never upon
the theory of inability to perform." There 
is no discussion of the
form of remedy. The case might possibly 
be said to stand upon the
ground that while a debt arose by virtue 
of the reciprocal promisrs
it could not be recovered by action, 
until performance of the
plaintiff's condition precedent. The more 
reasonable and probable
interpretation, however, is that no debt 
was created by the mutuat
promises.1'
In another long series of cases,
15 the theory that a promise, with-
out the quid pro quo necessary to make 
it a grant, does not create a
legal debt, is supported by the fact that 
the promisee is not allow-
ed to sue for the amount promised in 
case of the promisor's repud-
iation, but is limited to damages, even 
though he has been able to
perform his own promise after the other 
party's repudiation. These
cases are usually put, expressly.or tacitly, 
uon the ground that ihe
promisee may not increase the amount 
of his damage after breach,
or repudiation, by the promisor. But, 
whatever the reason, the fact
stands that the promisee, who has given 
only a counter promise.las
consideration, can not recover the specific 
amount promised, but is
limited to recovery of damages, even though 
he is able and willing
to perform the promise that he himself 
has given. A seller who has
promised to pass title, but has not actually 
done so at the time of
the buyer's repudiation, is in the same 
position as one who has not
performed other consideration at the time 
of the repudiation: The
analogy of the cases seems, therefore, to 
be precise.
This is the background and analogy of 
the legal right of a seller
whose buyer has refused to accept 
title. While the authority is
scant, and anything but" definite in its 
expressed theory, the sum
14 So also. Wiaext v. Marrs, uo Mich. 
69: Howard v. Dalv, 61 N. Y. 
362. no right
to iue for wages. on breach of 
contract of employment, but only 
for resulting damages;
Black v. Woodrowl. 39 Md. t94.
15 Unexcelled Fire-warks Co. v. Polites. 13o Pa. 536: Funke 
v. Allen. S4 Neb. 407.
Pittsburg, etc. R. R. Co. v. Aeck 
So Ind. 303; Dillon v. Anderso", 43 
N. Y. 231; Gibbons
v. Bente. Si Minn. A99; Heiser v. 
Mears, tao N. C. 443; Grand Rapids 
Furniture Co. v.
Robinso. 7 0. D. Rep. 388: See. 
"Repudiation of Contracts," 14 Harv. 
L. Rev. 423.
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total of its implication is adverse to the right of such a seller to
sue in debt for the purchase price.
This brings us to the actual decisions arising out of contracts of
sale. A number of these hold directly that the seller can recover
the whole amount promised, without having at any time passed title
to the buyer. Most of these, however, are specifically predicated up-
on the fact that a real quid pro quo, distinct from the title or the
promise to convey the title, has been received by the buyer in return
for his grant of the sum named. By such findings the cases are
brnight wholly into harmony with the proposition that money be-
comesdue under a promise to pay only if there has been something
more in ieturn for the promise than a mere counter promise. A fre-
quently cited case of this type is Burnley v. Tufts.1G Tufts had sold
to Burpley a soda-water apparatus, with the'express stipulation that
-title should not pass till the price had been paid, and that payments
should be made at stated dates. It does not appear that there was
any express agreement that Burnley should have possession of the
apparatus during the time allowed for payment, but such was ob-
viouily the intent of the parties. The apparatus was destroyed by
fire, while in Burnley's possession, although without his fault. Tufts
sued for the purchase price, after the stated time for payment had
passed, and was allowed to recover. The opinion clearly shows that
the giving possession of the apparatus was taken by the court to be
tofisideration for the promise to pay, and that this consideration
had been: executed. There was therefore a quid pro quo, in the
sense of something of value received, for the buyer's grant of the
pp e. 'Burnley," said the court, "unconditionally and absolutely
promised to pay a gertain sum for the property, the possession of
which he received fiom Tufts. The fact that the property has been
,estmyed while lh his custody and before the time for the payment
of. the last note due, on payment- of which only his right to the
legal te of -the property would have accrued does not relieve him
of payment of the price agreed upon. He got exactly what he con-
tracted for, viz., the possession of the ptoperty and the, right to ac-
'quire an -absolute title by payment of the agreed price. The trans-
action was something more than an executory conditional sale. The
seller had done all that he was to do except to receive the purchase
priee; the purchaser -had received all that he was to receive as the
sonsideration. of his promise to pay."'"
fAccod. White v. Solamox, x64 Mass. $t6; NoelI Cth "Reg. Co. T. Hill ts6 X. C.272; Bairc, -v. Hutchixs. zos U. S. s4o; Am. Soda.-foxtaix Co. v. Veugh., 69 N. J. L.
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Other cases are extremely vague as to whether they. proceed upon
the reasoning of Tufts v. Burnley or stand as* authority for the
proposition that the promise to pay, in consideration of a reciprocal
promise, of itself creates a legal obligation to pay the stated amount.
Thu , in National Cash Register Co. v. Dhe.,;" recovery of the
purchase price was allowed, on the ground that "whether title passed
or not is of no consequence, in determining plaintiff's right to sue
for the entire amount to be paid * * * (It) does not depend upon the
vesting of title in the defendants, but upon the promises of defend-.
ants contained in the contract." This in its context clearly indicates
that the right to the money is without regard to executed considera-
tion or quid pro quo, but the authority cited by the court is White v.
Solomon, i which was decided expressly on the ground that there
was an executed consideration on which to found the'debt."
A few cases, however, do allow recovery of the agreed price,
without any pretense of an executed consideration of quid pro quo,
simply on the ground of the promise to pay.'
In actions on contracts for the sale of real estate, suit for the-
ptrchase price, as a debt, seems to be allowed, at least when pay-
ment of the price is precedent to the passing of title. So long ago
as Pordage v. Cole,' a vendor of land was allowed to sue in.debt for
the agreed price, payable on fixed dates, before title-had passed. A
note following the case practically repeats Thorpe v. Thorpea to
the effect that, "If a day be appointed for the payment of the money,
and the day is to happen before the thing can be performed, an
action may be brought for the money before the thing be done; for
it appears that the party relied upon his remedy, and intended not
to mike the performance a condition precedent." But these cases
sS', "What was the consideration of the note? If the passing. of the title to the ap-
paratus was the.ponsideration, the defense must prevaiL If the delivery of the a'paratus
with the right to acquire title, was the eonsideration the plaintiff must prevaiL- We think
the consideration for the note was the delivery of the apparatus.w h the right to acquire
title." Harley v. Stanley, =s Okla. 89; Lavalley -.. Re--, 78 Vt. XS21 et. s&.
s 139 Mich. 406.
'164 Mass. $i6.
mKilmer v. Moneyweight Scale Co. 36 Ind. Ap. s68, "The buyers were-absolutely
bound to pay the purchase price" * * 0 "they were bound by their lawful contract according
to its terms." "In such a contract of sale, the possesiion and useJo be in the buyer. the
title to remain in the seller until full payment, there'is a -su ciext -consideracion for te
absolute promise to pay the agtreed price."
"1 Appleton v. Norwalk Library Co.. S3 Conn. 4; Beac'x .Appeal, S8 Conn. 464, suit
was on the promissory note: Jaeagli i. Rhear:. 30 Tex. Civ. Ap. 212; 'a',: Booth. 71
N. Y. S. zots: Cambridge Soc. v. Elliott. 98 N. Y. S. 232; Krebs Miop. o.'r. Livestley,
51 Ore. 5 7, .emble; Dederick Y. Wolfe, 68 Miss. soo, suit on proriisory pote.
22 z Saund. 32o 8s Eng. Rep. 449.
20 x Salk. 171; 91 Eng. Rep. 157. -
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were, after all, as said in Pordage v. Cole, actions of "debt upon a
specialty." It might well have been the seal which gay rise to the
debt, and not the simple promise. However there was no seal upon
the contract in the recent case of Lookabaugh v. Gourley." The
vendor was permitted to sue for the full amount of installments
due. The only point discussed by the court was whether tender of
a conveyance was a condition precedent. Acceptance of title by the
vendee seems not to have been even considered as a possible essen-
tial to the recovery sought.
If, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, it be assumed that a
seller who has not passed the title can not sue for the purchase price
itself, the question is -raised whether he can convert the buyer's
promise into a grant of the price, by thrusting title upon him against
his will. Such a result would, of course, be utterly illogical, and the
buyer's "grant" would be only a fiction of ihe law. But the inquiry
is, here, rather what the law is, than what it logically ought to be.
-There is a great deal of dictum to the effect that the seller may thus
thrust title upon the buyer and sue him for the price. This is usual-
ly stated in the form of a persistent quotation that "The vendor of
personal property in a suit against the vendee for not taking and
paying for the property, has the choice ordinarily of either one of
-three methods to indemnify himself. (i) He may store or retain
the property for the vendee, and sue him for the entire .purchase
price, (2) *** ." This statement was originally formulated in
Dustan v. McAndrew," and is one of the most widely quoted pieces
of mere unnecessary dictum to -be found in the law. That case
was not itself a suit for the purchase price, but was an action for
damages only, and the statement in regard to suit for the price was
oaly dicta. Of the two cases cited in Duston v. McAndrew as au-
thority for the statement, -one was itself an action for damages only,
and in the other. title had clearly passed, in accord with the usual
rules of presumption, before the buyer's breach.
The subsequent quotations of this so-called rule have themselves,
for the most part, been dictum. In many of the cases repeating it,
title had passed to the buyer according to the usual rules." In most
,of them action was really for damages only." The statement has,
-however, been actually followed in a number of cases.28
26 (Oka. 918) 171 Pac. 464.
244 N.Y. 72.
"Ames v. Moir, 13o IlL s82; Meagher v.,Cowixg, 149 Ich. 416;
N Habeler v. Rogers, 13t Fed. 43: Kinkead v. Lynch. '132 Fed. 692; Krebs Hop. Co.
v. LivesIey. 59 Ore. S74; Range Co. v. Merchantile Co. :o Mo. Ap. 438; Van Brocklen v.
Smeallie, 14o N. Y. 7o: Cwo;nock v. Price. 1o3 Ill. Ap. xg; fagne$ v. Sioux City Co.,
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In cases of conditional sale, where the promise is to pay -before
title passes, there seems to be a general tendency to hold that the
seller may elect to treat the title as being in the buyer and sue for
the price. These however are not necessarily in conflict with the
proposition that the seller may not thrust title upon an unwilling
buyer, nor do they more appropriately support the proposition that
he may so force it upon the buyer. They are cases in whicli the
actual possession is already in the buyer_ As.welave seen a-number
of cases expressly say that this possession on the buyer's part is
what creates his legal obligation to pay the price, regardless of title
Even if this were not the assumption, the breach in these cases is
not a refusal to accept title and to pay for it. but a failure to make
the payments conditional -to .the eventual passing of title. - It may
well be presumed that the buyer's continued possession of the
goods is an acquiescence in the passing of title, if the seller is
willing to waive the condition precedent, and, in consequence, a
tacit grant of the right to the price.2- There is nothing in the de-
cisions to negative this, and the idea is clearly supported by the fat
that, as a general rule, a conditional vendor who has repossessed
himself of the goods is not thereafter allowed to sue for the price'
A case frequently said to support the theory that a seller can sue
despite the buyer's refusal to receive the title is Bement v. Smith."'
In this case the plaintiff had agreed to make a carriage for the
defendant who promised to pay therefor a certain sum. When the
carriage was completed, the maker offered it to the defendant who
refused to accept it. The maker then brought suit for the whole
14 Co1. A,. 219: Trunkey v. Hedstrum. 1.11 Ill. 204, in which the buyer was plaintiff.
asking damages for seller's failure to deliver; Mowry v. Kirk, S 0. D. Rep. 594, digested
as authority that seller may sue for price, although the action was by the buyer; Cullen v.
Bimm, 7 0. D. Rep. 388. action under the code, and seller's right to sue for price stated
as a rule. although the court specifically said the amount actually awarded was damages;
Moline Scale Co. v. Breed, sa Iowa 307, statement that an action for the price would have
been allowed if the seller's failure to tender possession had not precluded it.
m Crown Vinegar Co. v. Wehrs, S9 Mo. Ap. 493; Walker v. Nixon, 65 Mo. Ap. 326;
Walker Bros. v. DLaggett, .(Miss. 1917) 76 So. S69; 'Osgood v. Skinner, 211 lL 2.a9;
Restetter v. Reynolds; 16o Ind. 133; Mc'ormick C.0 v. Markert, io7 Iowa 34o; Busch
v. Stromberg Co., 226 Fed. 20. In some states- this alternative has been settled by
statute. e. g. So. Dakota. Comp. Laws. 1 3589;_ dlklahonm Civ. Code, 35ss'. -
Frisch v. Wells, oo Mass. 429; Smith v. Aldric, "x8o Mass. 67; .Bond v. Bourk,
54 Colo. Si: Crompton v. Beach, 62 Conn. aP: Turk v. Carnaham.'2 Ind. Ap. 2S;
Osborne v. Walther, 12 Okla.'ab; Shepard 'Y. Mills, 173-Ill. 223.
.Alesander i. Mobile Auto Co., 76 So.-944; Jones v. Bank" of Commerce, i99, S. W.
zo0j. -"
X 0 is Wend. 493 Cf., as in accord with this case, Shahen v. Vai flest, 25 0. S. 290.
But Niron v. "Nizon, 21 0. S. 114, was a sale of logs, fitle 'not passed; suit under code, on
- buyer's refusal to receive the logs; held; measure of damage was difference between
contract price and market value.
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sum promised, on counts for. work and labor performed and for
goods sold. To avoid the Statute of Frauds, the court held that it
was not necessary to have declared for goods bargained and sold,
and that the plaintiff could recover as for work and labor perform-
ed. There was, therefore, a real quid pro quo for the debt, in the
way of services performed for the defendant, if it may fairly be
said that the services, performed on materials which were not the
defendant's, were really of value to the defendant. Whether the
case supports the right of a seller to sue for the purchase price, on
the.buyer's refusal of title, depends on one's answer to the question
whether the defendant received anything of value other than the
title.
On the other hand, a number of cases have held distinctly and
positively that a seller can not, by thrusting title upon the buyer or
otherwise create in himself a legal right to the whole price, but that
he is limited to the amount of his damage. This was discussed at
length in Acme Food Co. v. Older.a2 The defendant had contracted
to buy of plaintiff three tons of a certain prepared poultry food.
The plaintiff set aside a proper amount for the defendant, but before
he could ship it to the defendat-which would, under the estab-
lished rules, have passed title to him-defendant repudiated his
agreement. Plaintiff shipped, nevertheless, but too late then, it
was held, to pass title. He sued for the whole, agreed price but was
limited to the difference between that amount and the market value
of goods, that is, to his damage suffered. The court said, "It is
sometimes said that the vendor in an executor- contract of sale has,
on the refusal of the vendee to accept the pr .erty, an election as
to whether he will treat it as his own and sue for damages for the
breach,- or treat it as that of the purchaser and sue for the price.
*** The classification of cases made by the text writers, is, in some
instances inaccurate. The writers* seem not to have observed in all
instances the distinctions and tests .'above mentioned. In other
words they have frequently classed cases in which the title had
. "64 W. Va. 2as. Accord, Hlluood Cask Reg. Co. v. Lutfint 279 Mss. 143;
Dowaagic Mfo. Co. v. hite Rock Co.,. iS"S. D. ios; Meagher v. Cowug, 149 Mich. 46,
the lower court held that suit could not be-.maintained because title blad not passed, the
upper court reversed the decision on.the ground that title had passed; Barry v. Quimby
2o6 -Mass. 2S9; Athsinsos.v. Bell, 8 Barn. & Cr. 277; Gammage v. Tie , 14 Tex. 413;
Funke v. AUex) S4 Neb. 407, oveirruling a' c"ntrar opinion in Likeols Shot Co. Y. Shel-
don, 44 Neb. 249; McCormick H'-vesting Co. v. Bal axy, 78 Minn. 370; Deere v. Gorman,
9 Kan. Ap. 675; Singer Mfg. Co.. .v. Cheney, at Ky. L R. $5o; Moody v. Brown, 34 Me.
1o7; Tufts v. Gre ter. 83 Me. 407; Joses v. Jennings, 268 Pa. 493; Girard Y. Taggart. $
Serg. & R. 4Pa.) sg, "Properly speaking, the seller can not recover the price, 
•  
he
recovers danlaces for the breach of a contract which was entirely executory when it was
broken."
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passedi or in which there was evidence from which the jury might
have found the fact, as cases in which it had not passed. In other
instances they have failed to observe that the executory contract
had become executed so as to pass the title before any renunciation
was made by the vendee. Indeed, there are very few cases in which
the seller has been allowed to recover the purchase price when the
title to the property had not passed to the buyer. The doctrine of
election when the title has not passed, seems to have grown out of
an unfortunate and inaccurate interpretation of certain cases made
by Mr. Sedgwick in his work on Damages." In another case, 2 while
the action was for damages, the court said in the course of its opin-
ion, "To allow the seller to recove the full purchase price of an
article, and compel the buyer to accept it whether he wants it or
not, is to grant specific performance of a contract for the sale of
personal property in favor of the seller, when no such relief could
or would be granted in favor of the buyer. This is against the *ell
established doctrines of courts of equity."
This criticism, that suit for the price would give the seller a
remedy not reciprocally available to the buyer, seems to be the only
practical objection .to allowing the seller to thrust title upon the
buyer and to sue for the price as a debt. This and, perhaps, the
suggestion of Mr. Justice HOLMES that a party does not contract to
do the specific thing named in the agreement, but to do that thing or
to pay the other party a money compensation for not doing it. To
allow the seller practical specific performance would be to ignore
the buyer's alternative. Aside from these possible objections, there
seems to be no reason why the courts should not slip a cog, as'it
were, in the purely logical progress of their judicial processes and
allow the seller his action in debt. But the fact stands that when
all the decisions are cancelled against one another, the ultimate re-
sult is opposed to such right in the seller.
JOHN BARKER WAITE.
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